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APR 24 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADMIRAL LESLIE C. STEVENS  
Psychological Strategy Board

SUBJECT : Analysis of CIA/ops's Capabilities to Support a  
National Psychological Strategy

REFERENCE : Memorandum to DD/P from Admiral Stevens dated 19 March 1952.

1. I am forwarding herewith a revised compilation of CIA/ops's capabilities, in accordance with your comments contained in referenced memorandum.

2. The paper is not to be construed as a final and irrevokable presentation and is, therefore, listed as a draft. This is in accordance with our understanding from your earlier request to prepare a preliminary paper for the initial study of the subject. It is expected that refinement and elaboration can be accomplished as the work of the National Psychological Strategy Committee warrants.

3. Since this document is a consolidation of CIA/ops's activities and capabilities, it is extremely sensitive, and, consequently, we have classified the document, "EYES ONLY." I request, therefore, that the document receive highly selective handling within the Psychological Strategy Board Staff.

Signed FRANK G. WISHER  
FRANK G. WISHER  
Deputy Director/Plans

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
DRAFT #6

24 April 1952

NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY

Section I: THE PROBLEM

Section II: BASIC AIMS AND TASKS



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DRAFT #6

CIA APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A  
NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY  
(Capabilities Paper)

Note: This paper deals with one approach toward the development of a national psychological strategy with principal emphasis on an appraisal of capabilities. A second paper is to be prepared by CIA which will select the covert actions which will be most effective regardless of CIA/opc's present or near-term future capabilities. A third paper will approach the development of a plan for a national strategy from the viewpoint of threats and risks.

I. THE PROBLEM

In the light of CIA/opc's greatest capabilities, both current (within 1952) and near-term future (within 1953): (a) how can CIA best contribute to the "retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence" and to "strengthening the orientation toward the United States of the peoples and nations of the free world," and, (b) what modifications in national policies would assist CIA in more effectively supporting the national effort?

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
## II. BASIC AIMS AND TASKS

The United States should not be diverted into fighting in areas of Soviet choosing, where a preponderance of strength, military or psychological, is massed against us. The U. S. needs an integrated total strategy capable of meeting the Soviet threat; a strategy flexible enough to adapt to changes in policies and circumstances, yet unyielding in its pursuance of strategic goals. To this end, we must:

A. Adopt a strategy which will enable us to gain the psychological initiative from the Soviets.

B. Establish closer coordination and integration of overt and covert activities.

To achieve these aims the United States must concentrate on the following major tasks:



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